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Expenditures on public pensions in Canada are projected to be over
C$54 billion in 2002–2003. The extensive income security system in Canada,
which consists of a demogrant, work-related pensions, and income-tested
transfers, provides an important source of income for older Canadians.
However, the system has experienced periodic crises when the streams of
projected future expenditures and revenues fall out of alignment. The fu-
ture may oﬀer further turbulence. The elderly dependency ratio in Can-
ada—the ratio of older persons to working-age persons—is projected to
rise from 0.20 in 2000 to 0.40 in 2050 (Oﬃce of the Superintendent of Fi-
nancial Institutions [1998]). As a result, this income security system may
face pressure for reform in the years to come.
Any reforms that reduce program generosity will have two types of
eﬀects on public sector budgets. The ﬁrst is a mechanical eﬀect of the re-
duction. The magnitude of the government’s beneﬁt expenditures and tax
receipts will change mechanically with any changes to the programs. The
second eﬀect is a dynamic eﬀect, through changing retirement behavior.
Our research has shown that the retirement decisions of older Canadians
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This implies that reform to this system can have important indirect eﬀects
on ﬁscal balances through behavioral changes.
In this chapter we explore the ﬁscal implications of two alternative re-
forms, and describe how these implications depend on the types of behav-
ioral responses estimated in our previous work. The ﬁrst reform that we
consider is a three-year increase in both the age at which individuals are el-
igible for early retirement beneﬁts, and the normal retirement age for all re-
tirement programs. The second is a move to a common income security
system for all countries in this research project. The Common Reform re-
places Canada’s existing mix of demogrants and earnings-related beneﬁts
with one large earnings-related beneﬁt, similar in structure to the existing
Canada Pension Plan.
Our major ﬁndings are that both of these reforms would have enormous
impacts on the ﬁscal position of the Canadian retirement income system.
An increase of three years in the age of beneﬁts eligibility would improve
the government’s ﬁscal position by about one-fourth of the base level of
beneﬁts, while the second reform raises net program expenditures by about
50 percent. For both reforms, we ﬁnd very important behavioral as well as
mechanical eﬀects. The ﬁrst reform signiﬁcantly reduces the percentage of
early retirement in Canada—between 21 and 49 percent of the reduction
in program expenditures come from behavioral responses to this reform.
The behavioral response manifests itself in the government budget through
lower beneﬁt payments paid to, and more taxes collected from, workers
who retire later than under the base system. For the Common Reform, the
ﬁscal implications of behavioral response are also large in magnitude but
smaller relative to the mechanical eﬀect of the increased beneﬁts.
We also document important distributional implications of reform. A de-
lay in retirement ages has somewhat larger negative eﬀects for upper-income
groups, as they see the largest eﬀective reduction in their beneﬁts. On the
other hand, the Common Reform reduces eﬀective beneﬁts for the lowest-
income groups, by removing the income-tested component of transfers,
while at the same time dramatically increasing beneﬁts for upper-income
groups, whose beneﬁts now reﬂect more fully their higher lifetime earnings.
In the balance of this chapter, we ﬁrst describe, in detail, the components
of Canada’s retirement income system. This is followed by a recounting of
the empirical results from our earlier work, upon which the simulations in
this paper are based. We then lay out the simulation methodology employed.
Finally, the results are presented, along with some concluding remarks.
2.2 Canada’s Retirement Income System
The retirement income system in Canada has three pillars: (1) the Old
Age Security Program, (2) the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, and (3)
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(OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and the Allowance.
The third pillar includes occupational pensions as well as other private sav-
ings, including those accumulated in Registered Retirement Savings Plans
(RRSPs), which are a tax-subsidized savings vehicle. Our analysis focuses
on reforms to the ﬁrst two pillars of this system, which collectively are re-
ferred to as the Income Security (IS) system in Canada. We next provide a
brief description of the components of all three pillars, however, to provide
the proper context for our results.
2.2.1 The Old Age Security Program
The Old Age Security program is the oldest pillar of the current retire-
ment system, dating back to 1952. All beneﬁts paid out under the program
are ﬁnanced through general tax revenues rather than past or current con-
tributions. Its principal component is the OAS pension, which is currently
payable to anyone aged 65 or older who satisﬁes a residency requirement.1
The pension is a demogrant, equal to $442.66 in March 2002. Individuals
who do not meet the residence requirement may be entitled to a partial
OAS beneﬁt. Beneﬁts are fully indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
and are fully taxable under the Income Tax Act. There is also an additional
“clawback” of beneﬁts from high-income beneﬁciaries. Their beneﬁts are
reduced by 15 cents for every dollar of personal net income that exceeds
$56,968.
A second component of the OAS program is the GIS. It is an income-
tested supplement for OAS pension beneﬁciaries that has been in place
since 1967. There are separate single and married beneﬁts that in 2002
(January to March) were $526.08 and $342.67 (per person) monthly, re-
spectively. The income test is applied annually, based on information from
an individual’s (and his or her partner’s) income tax return. Income for the
purpose of testing is the same as for income tax purposes, with the exclu-
sion of OAS pension income. Unlike the OAS clawback, the income test-
ing of GIS beneﬁts is based on family income levels. Beneﬁts are reduced
at a rate of 50 cents for each dollar of family income, except for couples in
which one member is age 65 or older and the other is younger than 60. For
these couples, the reduction is 25 cents for each dollar of family income.
The GIS is fully indexed to the CPI and is not subject to income taxes at ei-
ther the federal or provincial level.
The ﬁnal component of the OAS program is the Allowance, which until
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1. Individuals must have been a Canadian citizen or legal resident of Canada at some point
before application, and have resided in Canada for at least ten years (if currently in Canada)
or twenty years (if currently outside Canada). The beneﬁt is prorated for pensioners with less
than forty years of Canadian residence, unless they are grandfathered under rules that apply
to the persons who were over age 25 and had established attachment to Canada prior to July
1977.recently was called the Spouse’s Allowance.2 This component was intro-
duced in 1975. The Allowance is an income-tested beneﬁt available to 60-
to 64-year-old partners3 of OAS pension recipients and to 60- to 64-year-
old widows/widowers. For partners, the beneﬁt is equal to the OAS pension
plus the GIS at the married rate. An income test reduces the OAS pension
portion of the Allowance by 75 cents for each dollar of family income un-
til it is reduced to zero, and then the combined GIS beneﬁts of both part-
ners are reduced at 50 cents per dollar of family income. For a widowed
partner, the beneﬁt is equal to the OAS pension plus GIS at the widowed
rate, and is taxed-back equivalently. The Allowance is also fully indexed to
the CPI and again is not subject to income taxes at either the federal or
provincial level.
2.2.2 The Canada/Quebec Pension Plan
The second pillar of the retirement system, and the largest component of
the IS system, is the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Quebec Pension Plan
(QPP). These programs, started in 1966, are administered separately by
Quebec for the QPP and the federal government for the CPP.
In contrast to the OAS program, the CPP/QPP are contributory pro-
grams. They are ﬁnanced by payroll taxes on both employers and employ-
ees, each at a rate of 4.7 percent (2002). The base for the payroll tax is earn-
ings between the Year’s Basic Exemption ($3,500) up to the Year’s
Maximum Pensionable Earnings (YMPE, $39,100 in 2002). The YMPE
approximates average earnings and is indexed to its growth.
To be eligible for beneﬁts, individuals must make contributions in at
least one calendar year during the contributory period. The contributory
period is deﬁned as the period from attainment of age eighteen, or January
1, 1966, if later, and normally extended to age 70 or commencement of the
retirement pension, whichever is earlier. Starting in 1984 for the QPP and
1987 for the CPP, beneﬁts can be claimed as early as age 60. The normal re-
tirement age is 65, and there is an actuarial reduction in beneﬁts of 0.5 per-
cent for each month the initial claim precedes this age, resulting in a max-
imum 30 percent reduction for claims on the 60th birthday. Symmetrically,
beneﬁts are increased by 0.5 for each month the initial claim succeeds age
65, to as late as age 70 (the maximum adjustment is therefore 30 percent).
Finally, if an individual claims before age 65, their annual rate of earnings
cannot exceed the maximum retirement pension payable at age 65 for the
year in which the pension is claimed. This earnings test is only applied at
the point of application, however. Subsequently, there is no check on the
individual’s earnings.4
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2. Baker (2002) studies the retirement incentives in the Spouse’s Allowance.
3. The Allowance is available to both spouses and common-law partners (same sex or op-
posite sex) of OAS pension beneﬁciaries.
4. There are no restrictions on returning to work after the beneﬁt is being paid.To calculate beneﬁts, an individual’s earnings history is ﬁrst computed.
The earnings history is based on earnings in the contributory period less
any months (a) receiving a disability pension, (b) spent rearing small chil-
dren,5 (c) between age 65 and the commencement of the pension,6 and (d)
15 percent of the remaining months. The last three of these exclusions can-
not be used, however, to reduce the contributory period below 120 months
after taking into account the oﬀset for months of disability pension re-
ceipt. The ratio of each month of earnings in the contributory period to
1/12 of the YMPE for that period is then calculated, with the ratio capped
at 1. Excess earnings in one month above 1/12 of the YMPE may be applied
to months in the same calendar year in which earnings are below 1/12 of
the YMPE.
Earnings over the earnings history period are then converted to current
dollars in three steps. First, the average of the earnings ratios over the con-
tributory period is calculated. Second, this average is multiplied by a pen-
sion adjustment factor. Until 1998, the pension adjustment factor was the
average of the YMPE over the three years prior to (and including) the year
of pension receipt. This average was raised to four years for beneﬁts
claimed in 1998 and ﬁve years for beneﬁts beginning in 1999. Finally, the
product of the earnings ratios and the pension adjustment factor is multi-
plied by 25 percent to arrive at the annual beneﬁt. This beneﬁt can be
thought of as a pension that replaces 25 percent of earnings for someone
who has average earnings over his or her lifetime. In 2002, the maximum
possible monthly retirement beneﬁt works out to $788.75.
While CPP/QPP retirement beneﬁts are based solely on an individual’s
earnings history,7 survivor pensions are either all or partly based on the
earnings history of the deceased. Partners are eligible for survivor pensions
if the deceased made contributions for the lesser of ten years or one third
of the number of years in the contributory period. For survivors under age
65, beneﬁts are equal to a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt plus 37.5 percent of the earnings-
related pension of the deceased spouse. If the survivor is not disabled or
has no dependent children the beneﬁt is reduced by 1/120 for each month
she or he is younger than age 45, such that no beneﬁt is payable to individ-
uals aged 35 or younger. Also, beneﬁts to survivors who have dependent
children and who are under age 35 only continue as long as the children are
dependent.8 For survivors aged 65 and above, the pension is equal to the
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5. This is deﬁned as months where there was a child less than seven years of age and the
worker had zero or below average annual earnings.
6. Periods after age 65 to age 70 can be substituted for periods prior to age 65 if this will in-
crease their future retirement pension.
7. Couples do have the option of sharing their beneﬁts for income tax purposes, since tax-
ation is at the individual level. Each spouse can claim up to half of the couple’s total CPP/QPP
pension credits. The exact calculation depends on the ratio of their cohabitation period to
their joint contributory period.
8. Up to age 18, or age 25 if they are in school.greater of (a) 37.5 percent of the deceased’s retirement pension, plus 100
percent of the survivor’s own retirement pension, or (b) 60 percent of the
deceased’s retirement pension, plus 60 percent of the survivor’s own re-
tirement pension. There is an upper cap on total payments equal to the
maximum retirement pension payable in that year.9 Under changes made
eﬀective in 1998, however, the rules for maximum payout are changed. The
survivor simply receives the larger of her or his own retirement pension or
her or his survivor pension plus 60 percent of the smaller. Finally, under the
CPP, children of decreased contributors are also entitled to a (ﬂat-rate)
beneﬁt if under 18 or a full-time student between 18 and 25 (the corre-
sponding QPP beneﬁt ends at age 18).10
A ﬁnal dimension of the CPP/QPP is the disability beneﬁt program. The
basic beneﬁt is made up of a ﬂat-rate portion, paid to all disabled workers,
and an earnings-related portion, which is 75 percent of the applicable CPP/
QPP retirement pension, calculated with the contributory period ending at
the date of disability. Fewer than 5 percent of Canadian men are on CPP/
QPP disability (more information can be found in Gruber [2000]).
CPP/QPP beneﬁts have been fully indexed to the CPI since 1973. Also,
beneﬁts are fully taxable by the federal and provincial governments.
2.2.3 Private Savings
The third pillar of the retirement income system is the proceeds of
private savings. These can take a variety of forms, some of which are ex-
plicitly regulated by either federal or provincial governments. For many
individuals, the most important form is private occupational pensions. In
1997, 41.2 percent of paid workers were covered by occupational pensions,
with coverage slightly higher for males than for females (Statistics Canada
1999). Deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions are overwhelmingly the most common (86
percent of plan members in 1997) although the recent trend is toward more
deﬁned contribution plans.
The other main form of private savings having a public policy dimension
is savings in Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs). Contributions
are deducted from gross earnings in the calculation of taxable income.
While in the RRSP, investment earnings on the contributions accumulate
tax free. There is an annual limit on contributions that is lower for individ-
uals who participate in an occupational pension plan. Unused contribu-
tion room can be carried forward indeﬁnitely. Finally, there are rules cov-
88 Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
9. If the surviving spouse is receiving his or her own CPP disability pension, the sum of the
earnings-related portion of the two pensions cannot exceed the maximum retirement pension
available in the year.
10. There is also a lump-sum death beneﬁt, which is generally equal to one-half of the an-
nual CPP/QPP pension amount up to a maximum ($3,500 in 1997). Under the 1997 legisla-
tion, this maximum is ﬁxed at $2,500 for all years after 1997, and in the case of the QPP all
death beneﬁts are set at this level.ering the start and minimum payout of these savings over the retirement
years. More information on RRSPs can be found in Milligan (2002).
2.3 Base Empirical Model
The behavioral responses to the policy reforms considered in this chapter
are predicted using an empirical model of retirement outlined and estimated
in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2004). A full description and details of the
estimation can be found in that paper. For the current purpose we provide a
brief description of the data used to estimate the model as well as a discus-
sion of the estimates on which our policy reform simulations are based.
The primary data source is the Longitudinal Worker File, developed by
Statistics Canada.11This is a 10 percent random sample of Canadian work-
ers for the period 1978–96. The data are the product of information from
three sources: the T-4 ﬁle of Revenue Canada, the Record of Employment
ﬁle of Human Resources Development Canada, and the Longitudinal Em-
ployment Analysis Program ﬁle of Statistics Canada.
T-4s are forms issued annually by employers for any employment earn-
ings that exceed a certain annual threshold and/or trigger income tax, con-
tributions to Canada’s public pension plans, or Employment Insurance
(EI) premiums.12 Employers issue Record of Employment forms to em-
ployees in insurable employment whenever an earnings interruption oc-
curs.13The Record of Employment ﬁle records interruptions resulting from
events such as strikes, layoﬀs, quits, dismissals, retirement, and maternity
or parental leave. Finally, the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Pro-
gram data is a longitudinal data ﬁle on Canadian businesses at the com-
pany level. It is the source of information on the company size and indus-
try of the jobs in which employees work.
The Longitudinal Worker File data provide information on the T-4
wages and salaries and three-digit industry for each job an individual holds
in a given year, their age, and sex,14the province and size (employees) of the
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11. The construction of the database is described in Picot and Lin (1997) and Statistics
Canada (1998). Our description draws heavily on these sources.
12. The data include incorporated self-employed individuals who pay themselves a salary,
but not other self-employed workers. The federal program that provides insurance against un-
employment changed names from Unemployment Insurance to Employment Insurance in
1996. In this paper we use Employment Insurance throughout when referring to this program.
13. Over the sample period, insurable employment covers most employer-employee rela-
tionships. Exclusion includes self-employed workers, full-time students, employees who work
less than ﬁfteen hours per week and earn less than 20 percent of maximum weekly insurable
earnings (20 percent   $750   $150 in 1999). Individuals working in insurable employment
pay Employment Insurance (EI) contributions on their earnings and are eligible for EI bene-
ﬁts subject to the other parameters of the EI program.
14. Information on the age and sex of individuals is taken from the T-1 tax returns, which
individuals ﬁle each year. To obtain this information, therefore, it is necessary that he or she
ﬁled a tax return at least once in the sample period.establishment for which they work,15 and their job tenure, starting in 1978.
Because T-4s are also issued for EI income, we also observe any insured un-
employment/maternity/sickness spells. To extend the earnings histories we
merged earnings information for 1975 through 1977 from the T-4 earnings
ﬁles for these years. We then backcast earnings to 1971, using cohort-
speciﬁc earnings growth rates calculated from the 1972, 1974, and 1976
Census Family ﬁles of the Survey of Consumer Finance,16 applied to a
three-year average of an individual’s last valid T-4 earnings observations.
Finally, histories back to 1966 (the initial year of the CPP/QPP) were con-
structed, using the earnings growth rates implied by the cross-section pro-
ﬁle from the 1972 Survey of Consumer Finances, appropriately discounted
for inﬂation and productivity gains using the Industrial Composite wage
for the period 1966–70.17
The marital status and any spouses of individuals in our sample were
identiﬁed using information from the T-1 family ﬁle maintained by Statis-
tics Canada. T-4 earnings histories for the period 1966 to 1996 were then
constructed for the spouses, using the procedures outlined previously.
The retirement model is estimated using the data on individuals’ labor
market decisions over the period 1985 to 1996. Separate samples of males
and females aged 55 through 69 in 1985 were drawn, and then younger co-
horts of individuals were added as they turn 55 in the years 1986–91.18
Agricultural workers and individuals in other primary industries were ex-
cluded.19 The sample was selected conditional on working, so the focus is
on the incentives for retirement conditional on being in the labor force.
Work was deﬁned as positive T-4 earnings in two consecutive years. Re-
tirement was deﬁned as the year preceding the ﬁrst year of zero earnings
after age 55. If an individual had positive earnings in one year and zero
earnings in the following year, the year of positive earnings was considered
the retirement year. Note that since T-4s are not issued to the unincorpo-
rated self-employed, this deﬁnition of retirement also captures any persons
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15. The records of the Longitudinal Worker File data are at the person/year/job level. For
some calculation it is necessary to aggregate the data to the person/year level. In years in
which an individual has more than one job, there will be multiple measures of tenure, in-
dustry,ﬁrm size, and in some cases, province. In these cases the characteristics of the job with
the highest earnings for the year are used.
16. We use samples of paid workers with positive earnings in the relevant birth cohorts.
17. The data on the Industrial Composite wage are from Statistics Canada (1983). The ob-
vious limitation of this backcasting approach is that we will not predict absences from the la-
bor market, which may be important at younger ages.
18. Individuals with missing age, sex, or province variables are excluded from the sample.
19. We make this exclusion because our deﬁnitions of retirement are based on earnings, and
the earnings streams for these workers, given high rates of self-employment and special pro-
visions in the Employment Insurance system for ﬁshers and other seasonal workers, are diﬃ-
cult to interpret. For example, individuals in these industries are observed with years of very
small earnings (in the hundreds of dollars) and no (or sporadic) evidence of EI beneﬁts, who
were too young to collect IS beneﬁts. One possibility is that they are primarily unincorporated
self-employed, and therefore the majority of their earnings are unobserved.moving from paid employment into this sector.20Only the ﬁrst observed re-
tirement for each individual was considered. If a person reentered the la-
bor market after a year of zero earnings, the later observations were not
used. Finally, individuals were only followed until age 69.
An additional important piece of information for calculating retirement
incentives is participation in an occupational pension plan. The Longitu-
dinal Worker File data has no information on this participation. To pro-
vide some control for the eﬀects of these pensions, we imputed a probabil-
ity of participation in a private pension plan to each sample individual
based on his or her three-digit industry. The probabilities were computed
from the 1986 to 1990 Labour Market Activity Survey and the 1993 to 1996
Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
The retirement model estimated was
(1) Rit    0    1ISW it    2ACCit    3AGEit    4EARNit    5APEit
   6SPEARNit    7SPAPE    8RPP it    9Xit    it,
where Ris a 0/1 indicator of retirement in the current year, ISWis the pres-
ent discounted value of family IS wealth, ACC is a measure of the accrual
in ISW with future additional years of work, AGE is alternatively a linear
control for age or a full set of age dummies, EARN and APE (SPEARN
and SPAPE) are cubics in an individual’s (his or her spouse’s) projected
earnings21 in year t and his or her Average Pensionable Earnings,22 RPP is
the probability of participation in a private pension plan, and X are con-
trols for marital status, tenure, own and spouse’s labor market experience,
industry, establishment size, and province and year eﬀects. Each individual
contributes observations for each (consecutive) year that she or he has pos-
itive T-4 earnings after entering the sample up to the year of retirement or
age 69, whichever comes ﬁrst. The equation was estimated separately by
sex as a probit.
For each year an individual is observed in the data, family ISWwas con-
structed for the current year as well as for all potential future retirement
years. As described in our previous paper, many of the provisions of the IS
system are implemented in the calculation. Exclusions occurred where we
did not observe the necessary information. These included any residency
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20. While older individuals do work in unincorporated self-employment, the proportion
doing so remains fairly constant over our sample period. For males, Canadian Census data
(Individual Files for 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996) reveal that the proportion of the population of
60–64 year olds (65 year olds) working in this sector is 0.08–0.09 (0.04) in Quebec and 0.13–
0.16 (0.06–0.8) in the rest of Canada between 1980 and 1995. For females the statistics are
0.01 (0.00–0.01) in Quebec and 0.2–0.4 (0.01) in the rest of Canada.
21. All earnings forecasts were made by applying a real growth rate of zero percent per year to
the average of an individual’s observed earnings in the three years preceding the retirement year.
22. Average Pensionable Earnings is the average earnings over an individual’s earnings his-
tory used to calculate their CPP/QPP entitlement. To capture potential nonlinear relation-
ships between earnings and retirement decisions, we also included a full set of interactions be-
tween the cubics in EARNit and APEit, and SPEARNit and SPAPEit.Table 2.1 Retirement probits—Males sample
Peak value model Option value model
Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies
ISW 0.077 0.022 0.067 0.012
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
$10,000 change∗ 1.60 0.45 1.38 0.23
ACCRUAL –0.577 –0.345 –0.284 –0.315
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009)
$1,000 change∗ –1.11 –0.67 –0.56 –0.61
RPP 0.124 0.123 0.124 0.126
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MARRIED –0.454 –0.173 –0.411 –0.110
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
TENURE –0.034 –0.033 –0.030 –0.029
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TENURESQ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
TENURE CENS 0.028 0.027 0.034 0.032
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
EXP –0.018 –0.018 –0.014 –0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP SQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
SPOUSE EXP –0.029 –0.029 –0.027 –0.028
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SPOUSE EXPSQ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
AGE 0.033 0.039
(0.001) (0.001)
AGEDIFF 0.001 –0.003 –0.001 –0.004


















(0.017) (0.018)requirements, or the CPP/QPP dropout provisions for time spent rearing
young children. Finally, our model does not incorporate the behavioral re-
sponses of any spouses. We simply assume that any spouse begins to col-
lect each component of IS at the earliest possible age. While this may lead
to an underestimation of a family’s behavioral response to policy, this as-
sumption was necessary to keep our model tractable.
Various measures of ACC were considered in the estimation. For the
policy simulations that follow we use estimates based on two forward-
looking speciﬁcations of accrual—peak value and option value. Peak value
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between current ISW and the peak or maxi-
mum of expected ISW along its lifetime proﬁle. For ages after the peak is
reached, the peak value takes a value equal to the year-over-year diﬀerence
in ISW.Option value is an analogous calculation, but is expressed in terms
of utility and incorporating the value of leisure. Here the accrual is the
diﬀerence between the utility of retiring today versus the optimal retire-
ment date that maximizes the expected stream of utility, sometime in the
future. We adopted the original speciﬁcation of the indirect utility function
used by Stock and Wise (1990), but directly parameterized it rather than
jointly estimating its parameters. A complete description of our speciﬁca-
tion is contained in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2004).
The estimates that form the basis of our policy simulations are presented
in tables 2.1 and 2.2 for males and females, respectively. For each measure
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Peak value model Option value model











Pseudo R2 0.100 0.115 0.099 0.116
Notes: ISW   income security wealth. AGEDIFF is the diﬀerence in ages between the indi-
vidual and his spouse (coded 0 for singles). Asterisk indicates reported statistic is the per-
centage point change in the probability of retirement for the indicated change in ISW or
accrual. Other control variables are 11 industry dummies, dummies for 6 categories of
establishment size, province and year eﬀects, a cubic in both own and spouse’s predicted earn-
ings and APE, and a full set of interactions between these cubics. The estimated parameters
on these additional variables are not reported.Table 2.2 Retirement probits—Females sample
Peak value model Option value model
Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies
ISW 0.082 0.030 0.076 0.017
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
$10,000 change* 1.74 0.61 1.63 0.34
ACCRUAL –0.306 –0.089 –0.116 –0.138
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
$1,000 change* –0.61 –0.18 –0.24 –0.28
RPP 0.160 0.158 0.157 0.159
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
MARRIED –0.247 –0.114 –0.238 –0.070
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
TENURE –0.012 –0.008 –0.012 –0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TENURESQ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
TENURE CENS –0.033 –0.032 –0.030 –0.031
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
EXP –0.039 –0.038 –0.038 –0.037
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP SQ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
SPOUSE EXP –0.009 –0.009 –0.009 –0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
SPOUSE EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
AGE 0.030 0.037
(0.002) (0.002)
AGEDIFF 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.002


















(0.021) (0.021)of accrual we report results from speciﬁcations that alternatively include
linear controls for age or age dummies. We also report the impact of a
$10,000 change in ISW, or a $1,000 change in the accrual measure. For
males, the results are uniformly supportive of an important role for IS in-
centives in determining retirement. There is a consistent positive and sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient on ISWand a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
accrual measure. Conditional on linear age, a $10,000 rise in ISW raises
the odds of retirement by 1.4 to 2 percentage points, from a base of 14.8
percent. When, alternatively, age dummies are included, the eﬀect of ISW
falls considerably, by $10,000, now raising retirement rates by 0.23 to 0.51
percentage points. This drop in the ISW coeﬃcient will be important for
understanding the following simulation results. The estimates of ACC are
also smaller when age dummies are included, but are less sensitive than
ISW. The eﬀects of a change in peak value are roughly half as large, while
the estimates for option value are essentially invariant to the inclusion of
age dummies.
For females, the estimates for ISWdisplay the same magnitudes and pat-
terns across speciﬁcations as the results for men. The estimates of ACC are
generally smaller than the results for males, but again display the same pat-
terns across speciﬁcations.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the age dummies for both males and females
display a distinct pattern, rising through the early 60s and peaking at age 65.
One possibility is that these dummies are capturing an age-speciﬁc pattern
of retirement that is due to nonlinear changes in the taste for leisure with age,
or institutions such as mandatory retirement that are not otherwise captured
in our model. An alternative is that the dummies capture responses to the
IS system that are not captured by ISW and ACC. In the latter case, we are
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Peak value model Option value model











Pseudo R2 0.104 0.116 0.104 0.116
Note: See table 2.1 notes.underestimating the eﬀects of the IS system. As we discuss in the following,
which of the alternatives better capture actual behavior has important im-
plications for the interpretation of our simulation results.
2.4 Simulation Methodology
The goal of our analysis is to examine the response of older workers to
diﬀerent counterfactual retirement income systems, and the overall ﬁscal
implications of these responses for the government budget. To do this, we
follow the retirement decisions and retirement income of a cohort of work-
ers from age 55 through the rest of their life under diﬀerent institutional ar-
rangements. In this section, we ﬁrst describe the selection of our cohort.
Next, we describe the methodology for the calculation of the IS ﬂows, fol-
lowed by the construction of the labor market exit probabilities. The penul-
timate subsection discusses our strategy for incorporating spousal re-
sponse into the analysis. Finally, we describe in detail the structure of the
two reforms we consider.
2.4.1 Cohort Selection
We select the cohort of men and women who were age 55 in 1991 from
our full dataset. This includes all of the 55-year-old men from 1991, as well
as the 55-year-old single females. Married females must be excluded to
avoid double counting of individuals, as our sample of married men will ac-
count for their IS behavior. The spouses of our married men are taken
without regard to their age. So, the cohort can be deﬁned as a representa-
tive sample of Canadian 55-year-old workers in 1991 and their spouses.23
To clarify the discussion that follows, we refer to those in the original
sample as cohort members and the spouses of the cohort members as
spouses.
Descriptive statistics appear in table 2.3. The sample includes 12,058
cohort members, of which 5,050 are married men, 3,662 single men, and
3,346 single women. The average age of the women married to our sample
men is 51.5, which is 3.5 years less than the age of the sample men. The men
have higher lifetime average pensionable earnings (APE) than the women
do, as well as more job tenure, labor market experience, and a higher prob-
ability of employment-based pension coverage.
2.4.2 Calculating the Flows of Beneﬁts and Taxes
We begin our analysis by calculating the beneﬁt and tax ﬂows that will
be received and paid by cohort members and their spouses from the age of
55 until age 102. Our interest in the IS beneﬁts is obvious—we wish to com-
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23. Our sample excludes those in primary industries and the self-employed, so it is only rep-
resentative of the population outside these sectors.pare the value of beneﬁts paid out to the cohort under the base and reform
IS systems. We account for taxes in order to show the full ﬁscal impact of
the reformed IS systems. If a reform induces workers to stay in the labor
force longer, then these workers will pay more in income taxes, payroll
taxes, and consumption taxes. These tax eﬀects can have a substantial im-
pact on government balances, as will be shown in our results.
Taxes pay for public expenditures other than IS beneﬁts, so the level of
tax revenue has no meaningful comparison with the levelof IS beneﬁts. In-
stead, the inferences we draw come from the diﬀerence in tax revenue un-
der diﬀerent reforms. Presumably, any extra work induced by the reforms
would have little impact on other demands for government spending, and
so would be a windfall gain to the government’s budget.
The IS and taxation system we consider is the one that prevailed in 1991.
The methodology we employ assumes that this system remains constant
in real terms into the future. Since 1991, the structure of the IS system
remains largely unchanged, although some program parameters have
changed.24 This may have some impact on the levels of the IS calculations
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24. The 1997 reform of the CPP/QPP system implemented several incremental changes in
the calculation of beneﬁts, but kept the core structure of actuarially adjusted earnings-related
beneﬁts replacing about 25 percent of preretirement earnings for average workers.
Table 2.3 Cohort characteristics
Males Females
All observations Married Single Single
Cohort members 12,058 5,050 3,662 3,346
Age 55 55 55 55
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Age of spouse 51.5 51.5 n.a. n.a.
(3.9) (3.9)
APE at age 55 19,337 21,717 20,597 14,364
(7,072) (5,696) (6,311) (7,850)
APE of spouse at age 55 5,782 13,807 n.a. n.a.
(8,820) (8,820)
RPP probability 0.537 0.578 0.570 0.439
(0.266) (0.258) (0.255) (0.263)
Labor market experience 12.5 13.0 12.7 11.4
(3.4) (3.0) (3.2) (3.9)
Labor market experience  11.4 11.4 n.a. n.a.
of spouse (6.3) (6.3)
Tenure 8.4 9.1 8.3 7.6
(5.1) (5.0) (5.2) (5.1)
Notes: Spousal characteristics averaged only over families with spouses. APE is expressed in
2001 euros.we make, but our inferences about how IS reform would change retirement
behavior are relevant so long as the structure of the IS system takes the
same basic form.
We calculate the three types of taxes in the following way. First, our
treatment of income taxes includes both provincial and federal income
taxes. Income taxes depend on the level of CPP/QPP beneﬁts, OAS bene-
ﬁts, labor market income, and nonlabor income assigned to each individ-
ual in the family under a particular IS system. Payroll taxes are calculated
based on labor market income. We account for the CPP/QPP payroll tax
and the Employment Insurance payroll tax.25 Both the employer and the
employee portions are counted. Finally, for consumption taxes, we calcu-
late a consumption tax factor that relates the proportion of consumption
taxes to disposable income.26 This factor is applied to the calculated after-
tax income of our cohort families to estimate the proportion of their in-
come that will end up as consumption tax revenue.
The assumptions about the impact of changes in work on government
revenue are necessarily imperfect. For example, we do not treat the impact
that an increase in labor supply might have on corporate proﬁt and the re-
sulting taxation of proﬁt. As well, our treatment of consumption taxes is
relatively crude. For these reasons, the resulting calculations should be in-
terpreted only as illustrative of the eﬀect changes in the IS system could
have on tax revenues.
The beneﬁt and tax ﬂows must be calculated for forty-eight diﬀerent
states of the world, representing the diﬀerent possible modes of exit from
the labor market as described immediately following. The ﬂows will be
combined with the probabilities of being in each state to arrive at a value
for the PDV of future beneﬁt and tax ﬂows for each family in our selected
cohort.
Our point of departure is the observation that each member of the co-
hort will leave the labor force at some age between 55 and 78. This exit may
take place by an exit to retirement or by an exit to death. These diﬀering
modes and ages for exit therefore comprise forty-eight diﬀerent states of
the world. From the point of exit forward, a DNPV calculation of future IS
ﬂows can be made to arrive at the ISW associated with each particular
labor market exit state. If the probability for each state is known, then the
total DNPV of all future IS ﬂows from the point of view of the original
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25. In 1991, the CPP/QPP payroll tax was 2.3 percent of earned income between $3,050 and
$30,500. This 2.3 percent rate was levied both on employers and on employees, so the total tax
rate was 4.6 percent. The Employment Insurance payroll tax was set for 1991 at $2.52 per $100
of earnings up to a cap of $35,360 for employees, and $3.53 on the same base for employers.
26. Personal Disposable Income from the national accounts for 1991 was $473,918 million
(CANSIM II series V691803). Total consumption taxes at all levels of government for ﬁscal
year 1991/1992 was $59,554 million (CANSIM II series V156262). Personal Disposable In-
come is reported net of indirect taxes, so the calculated consumption tax factor is [$59,554
million/($473,918 million   $59,554 million)]   0.1115.cohort when they are 55 can be calculated as an average of the state-speciﬁc
ISW, using the probabilities as weights in an expected-value calculation.
The ﬁrst task is to calculate the ﬂow of IS payments, income taxes, and
CPP/QPP premiums associated with each of the forty-eight states. We im-
plement this by calculating, for each age between 55 and 102, the IS ﬂows
for both the cohort member and the spouse. All future IS ﬂows are dis-
counted back to age 55 for time preference at a real 3 percent rate. For ages
past age 55, we project forward earnings as constant in real terms from
age 55.
The ﬂows we calculate are conditional upon the state under considera-
tion. For example, consider the “exit to retirement at 67” state. We assume
that the worker is in the labor force until age 66 and then retires at age 67.
We account for beneﬁts and taxes both before and after age 67—income
taxes, CPP/QPP premiums, and GIS payments may occur in years prior to
reaching age 67. We also assume that the worker is alive until at least age
67. In other words, beneﬁts and taxes are received and paid with probabil-
ity 1 until age 67, then using the life tables conditional on having reached
age 67 for ages beyond 67. The probability of the worker dying before hav-
ing reached age 67 will be accounted for in the construction of the proba-
bility of being in the “exit to retirement at age 67” state. The output of these
calculations is the family level of IS payments, income taxes, and CPP/QPP
premiums from the point of view of age 55 corresponding to each of the
forty-eight states.
2.4.3 Calculating the Probabilities
To arrive at the expected value of future IS ﬂows from age 55, we must
average the ﬂows received in each state using the probabilities associated
with each state. The calculation of the ﬂows associated with each state has
been described previously. The probabilities can be calculated using the
output of the models discussed in section 2.3. For each member of the co-
hort, we take the member’s observed characteristics (age, province, tenure,
etc.) and combine them with the estimated parameters displayed in tables
2.1 and 2.2 to generate a predicted probability of labor market exit. The key
component of this calculation is the set of IS incentive variables. We must
calculate the IS incentive variables for each potential age of exit, from age
55 to 78. The IS incentive variables can then be combined with the mem-
ber’s observed characteristics and the parameter estimates from our retire-
ment model to obtain the predicted probability of labor market exit at each
age from 55 to 78.
Predicting retirement after age 69 presents a challenge. Our empirical
model estimated the retirement behavior of workers from age 55 to 69. For
ages past 69, we therefore use the conditional probability of exit at age 69
for all ages from 69 on. This assumption has little impact on our overall
ﬁscal measurements, since the probability of remaining in the labor force
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that little weight is placed on these labor market exit states.
In our data, we cannot distinguish between death and retirement—in-
dividuals are observed as long as they receive T-4 forms. To decompose
our predicted probability of labor market exit into a probability of exit to
retirement and a probability of exit to death, we draw upon the age-
contingent life tables. At each age we subtract the actuarial probability of
death at that age from the predicted probability of labor market exit to ob-
tain the predicted probability of retirement for that age.
The next step in computing the state probabilities is to transform the
conditional age-speciﬁc exit rates to unconditional probabilities for each
state. Starting with 100 percent probability of survival at age 55, the con-
ditional probabilities of exit to retirement and to death at each age are mul-
tiplied by the remaining probability of survival. For example, if the proba-
bilities for exits to death and to retirement are 0.02 and 0.05 at age 55, then
those probabilities are multiplied by the probability of survival to age 55
(which is 1.0) to arrive at the probabilities for the age-55 states. For age 56,
the conditional probabilities for exit at age 56 are multiplied by 0.93, which
is the probability that the cohort member survived to age 56 (1.0–0.02–
0.05). This delivers the state probabilities for age 56. Continuing in this
way, the state probabilities for each age to 78 can be calculated.
2.4.4 Spouses
Spouses add a complication to these calculations. In our previous anal-
ysis, we held the spouse’s retirement decision ﬁxed at the ﬁrst age of eligi-
bility for retirement beneﬁts, in order to avoid the complexity of modeling
joint retirement decisions. For the simulation calculations we take a simi-
lar approach, assuming that any spouse retires at the age of ﬁrst pension
eligibility. As a check on this decision, we investigated a more ﬂexible ap-
proach on a small subsample. We averaged each of the forty-eight state
probabilities and ﬂows over the forty-eight possible labor market exit states
of the spouse. These simulations showed little change in the retirement in-
centives of our cohort members, compared to simulations with the ﬁxed
date of spousal retirement. This reﬂects two features of our situation. First,
there is not a great deal of interspousal dependence of beneﬁts in Canada.
Second, the assumption of retirement at the date of ﬁrst eligibility is a good
approximation of average spousal behavior. Given this evidence, we pro-
ceeded with the use of the ﬁxed spousal retirement assumption.
2.4.5 Reforms
In addition to performing these calculations for Canada’s existing IS
system, we also use this methodology to examine the impact of changes to
the IS system. The motivation for analyzing these reforms is not to advo-
cate for a particular structure for Canada’s IS system, but instead to
demonstrate the magnitude and shape of the ﬁscal eﬀects of reforms. We
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speciﬁc entitlement ages by three years. The second involves a shift to a
common system that is the same across all countries in the project.27
Three-Year Reform
Eligibility for all components of Canada’s IS system is at least partly de-
termined by age. In the Three-Year Reform, we raise the key entitlement
ages by three years. For the CPP/QPP, this means that the ﬁrst possible age
of receipt of early retirement beneﬁts is increased to 63, and the normal re-
tirement age is increased to 68. The age of GIS and OAS entitlement also
shifts up to 68. Finally, the Allowance is available to qualifying individuals
between the ages of 63 and 67.
The Three-Year Reform should aﬀect the level of ISW. Removing three
years of eligibility from a worker’s future beneﬁt ﬂows decreases the total
value of future ﬂows, meaning a lower level of ISW. Because our models
predict a positive wealth eﬀect on retirement decisions, this should lead to
a shift toward later retirements.
The eﬀects of this reform on dynamic incentives are both obvious and
subtle. The obvious eﬀect is a three-year shift in the age-dependent incen-
tives of the IS system. For example, each dollar of labor market earnings
reduce GIS entitlements by 50 cents (single) or 25 cents (married). Under
the Three-Year Reform, this large disincentive for continued work is de-
layed until age 68. Similarly, the dynamic incentives at age 60 due to the
availability of early retirement beneﬁts is now delayed to age 63.
More subtly, the Three-Year Reform should also attenuate the magnitude
of all dynamic incentives. Any change in the future yearly ﬂow of pension
entitlements caused by an extra year of work will have an impact over fewer
years of pension receipt. This suggests that both retirement-inducing and
retirement-delaying incentives will be smaller. Combined with the predic-
tions about the eﬀect of the reform on the level of ISW, we expect that the
Three-Year Reform will lead to a substantial shift toward later retirements.
Common Reform
The second reform imposes a common program structure on each
country in this project. We therefore refer to it as the Common Reform. It
involves a single, earnings-related public pension. The pension is based on
average real lifetime earnings calculated over the best forty years. We only
have twenty-six-year earnings histories for our cohort when we ﬁrst ob-
serve them at age 55,28 so the average is constructed over the number of
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27. Other countries in this project also simulated a reform with actuarially adjusted bene-
ﬁts. For the case of Canada, the actuarial adjustment reform replicated exactly the existing
Canadian income security system, rendering these simulations uninformative for Canada.
28. Our data include earnings histories constructed back to the onset of the CPP/QPP pro-
grams in 1966. Our selected cohort is 55 in 1991, meaning that we have only twenty-six years
of earnings for these workers.years of work until they reach forty years of work, and then the best forty
years thereafter. Wages are converted to constant dollars using a real-wage
index.29 The amount of the normal pension is set at 60 percent of the cal-
culated average lifetime earnings. The normal age of retirement in the
Common Reform is age 65. Early retirement beneﬁts are available from age
60, subject to an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent per year. A survivor
beneﬁt is paid, equal to the worker beneﬁt. However, a person is not en-
titled to both a survivor beneﬁt and a retirement pension at the same
time—only the larger of the two is received.
Relative to Canada’s current IS system, the Common Reform eliminates
the GIS, Allowance, and OAS beneﬁts. The beneﬁt structure is very simi-
lar, however, to that of the CPP/QPP, although with a much larger replace-
ment rate. Because there is no cap to pensionable earnings, high earners
should receive a much higher pension than they do under the existing
Canadian system. In contrast, low earners will do poorly under the Com-
mon Reform, as all beneﬁts become earnings dependent, in contrast to the
existing Canadian system with its earnings-independent demogrants.
The eﬀects of the Common Reform on retirement incentives are not as
straightforward as for the Three-Year Reform. The level of ISW may in-
crease for high earners but decrease for low earners. With the higher earn-
ings replacement rate, the incentive for extra years of work should be larger
than in the existing CPP/QPP, where the replacement rate is 25 percent and
capped for high earners. The early and normal retirement ages, as well as
the early retirement adjustment of 6 percent per year, coincide exactly with
the structure of the CPP/QPP. Finally, the elimination of the income-tested
beneﬁts will remove their dynamic retirement incentives.
2.4.6 The Eﬀects of Age
In section 2.3, we noted the diﬃculties in interpreting the estimates of
the age-dummy variables in our empirical models. The ambiguity is poten-
tially very important for our simulations of the Three-Year Reform, in
which we change the age structure of the IS incentives. As a consequence,
we implement two strategies that imply very diﬀerent interpretations in in-
vestigating this reform. In the ﬁrst, we do not shift the age dummies as the
entitlement ages increase. Here we assume that any age-speciﬁc propensi-
ties for retirement, as captured by the age dummies, are independent of the
parameters of the IS system. In the second strategy, we instead shift the age
dummies three years forward in parallel with the shift in program eligibil-
ity ages. The estimated coeﬃcient on the age-55 dummy becomes the
dummy for age 58, the age-56 dummy becomes the dummy for age 59, and
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29. The real wage index was created using the Industrial Composite Wage from 1966 to
1984, followed by the Industrial Average Wage from 1984 to 1998, along with the Con-
sumer Price Index. These are derived from Statistics Canada (1983) and Statistics Canada
(2000).so on.30 Here we allow the possibility that the age dummies capture latent
eﬀects of the IS system, and so are sensitive to the age parameters of the IS
system.
2.4.7 Decomposition
The total eﬀect of reforms to Canada’s retirement income system can be
decomposed into two eﬀects. To show this, we ﬁrst express the total eﬀect
of the reform as the diﬀerence of the “reform” IS ﬂows and the “base” IS
ﬂows:











The superscripts R and B index the reform case and the base case. The la-
bor market exit states are indexed by s. For each state s, there is a proba-
bility P s and a discounted ﬂow of IS payments, ISW s.
We decompose the total eﬀect by adding and subtracting a term that
combines the reform IS payments and the base probabilities:





















The second bracketed term we call the mechanical eﬀect. It measures the
diﬀerence in the discounted ﬂows between the new and the old IS systems,
holding retirement behavior constant. This is the cost to the treasury of in-
creased (or decreased) pension payments, with an assumption of static be-
havior. The ﬁrst bracketed term we call the ﬁscal implications of the behav-
ioral eﬀect. Here, holding ISW constant, we measure the eﬀect of the
change in the timing of retirement induced by the reform.
2.5 Results
We present three simulations for each of two measures of retirement in-
centives. The ﬁrst simulation is based on the estimates for the empirical
model with the linear control for age. The second is based on the estimates
for the model with age dummies, but assumes that the eﬀect of age as cap-
tured by the estimates of the dummies does not shift in tandem with the re-
forms (as discussed in section 2.4.6). Finally, in the third we again use the
age dummy model, but assume the eﬀects of age shift upward by three
years in the Three-Year Reform. Finally, for each of these simulations we
present both peak value and option value results.
The main results appear in tables 2.4 and 2.5. Going down each table, the
six panels correspond to the six simulations outlined previously. Going
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30. For ages 55 to 57, we apply the estimated coeﬃcient on the age-55 dummy, as coeﬃ-
cients on dummy variables from earlier ages were not estimated.Table 2.4 Total ﬁscal impact of reform
Present discounted value Total change relative to base (%)
Base Three-Year Common Three-Year Reform Common Reform
Peak value—linear age
Beneﬁts 111,106 91,328 192,515 –17.8 73.3
Taxes
Payroll 15,202 17,446 14,952 14.8 –1.6
Income 81,687 88,243 104,174 8.0 27.5
Consumption 37,595 37,878 43,529 0.8 15.8
Total 134,485 143,567 162,655 6.8 20.9
Peak value—age dummies (no shift)
Beneﬁts 110,720 91,062 192,179 –17.8 73.6
Taxes
Payroll 14,886 15,788 15,824 6.1 6.3
Income 80,334 81,294 111,991 1.2 39.4
Consumption 37,296 36,388 44,530 –2.4 19.4
Total 132,516 133,470 172,345 0.7 30.1
Peak value—age dummies (with shift)
Beneﬁt 110,720 91,182 192,179 –17.6 73.6
Taxes
Payroll 14,886 16,564 15,824 11.3 6.3
Income 80,334 84,542 111,991 5.2 39.4
Consumption 37,296 37,099 44,530 –0.5 19.4
Total 132,516 138,205 172,345 4.3 30.1
Option value—linear age
Beneﬁt 111,084 91,491 187,796 –17.6 69.1
Taxes
Payroll 15,182 16,821 12,537 10.8 –17.4
Income 81,313 85,075 93,608 4.6 15.1
Consumption 37,540 37,265 41,314 –0.7 10.1
Total 134,034 139,161 147,459 3.8 10.0
Option value—age dummies (no shift)
Beneﬁts 110,698 91,218 189,449 –17.6 71.1
Taxes
Payroll 15,029 15,666 14,503 4.2 –3.5
Income 80,746 80,427 106,679 –0.4 32.1
Consumption 37,394 36,245 43,370 –3.1 16.0
Total 133,170 132,338 164,552 –0.6 23.6
Option value—age dummies (with shift)
Beneﬁts 110,698 91,332 189,449 –17.5 71.1
Taxes
Payroll 15,029 16,216 14,503 7.9 –3.5
Income 80,746 82,646 106,679 2.4 32.1
Consumption 37,394 36,747 43,370 –1.7 16.0
Total 133,170 135,609 164,552 1.8 23.6
Notes:All values reported in 2001 euros. The ﬁrst three columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes un-
der the base plan and under the two illustrative reforms. The last two columns show the change relative
to the base, for beneﬁts and taxes. Each of the six panels down the table shows the results from a diﬀer-
ent simulation model.Table 2.5 Decomposition of the total eﬀect of reform
Change in present discounted value
Three-Year Reform Common Reform
Mechanical Behavioral Total Mechanical Behavioral Total
Peak value—linear age
Beneﬁts –19,481 –297 –19,778 78,881 2,528 81,409
Taxes: Total –4,784 13,866 9,083 36,115 –7,944 28,171
Net change –14,697 –14,163 –28,860 42,766 10,472 53,238
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.2 –12.7 –26.0 38.5 9.4 47.9
Peak value—age dummies (no shift)
Beneﬁt –19,524 –134 –19,658 78,008 3,451 81,459
Taxes: Total –4,762 5,716 954 35,684 4,145 39,829
Net change –14,762 –5,850 –20,613 42,323 –693 41,630
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.3 –5.3 –18.6 38.2 –0.6 37.6
Peak value—age dummies (with shift)
Beneﬁts –19,524 –14 –19,538 78,008 3,451 81,459
Taxes: Total –4,762 10,451 5,689 35,684 4,145 39,829
Net change –14,762 –10,464 –25,227 42,323 –693 41,630
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.3 –9.5 –22.8 38.2 –0.6 37.6
Option value—linear age
Beneﬁts –19,459 –134 –19,593 79,151 –2,438 76,713
Taxes: Total –4,778 9,905 5,127 36,231 –22,806 13,425
Net change –14,681 –10,039 –24,720 42,920 20,368 63,287
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.2 –9.0 –22.3 38.6 18.3 57.0
Option value—age dummies (no shift)
Beneﬁt –19,452 –28 –19,480 78,502 250 78,751
Taxes: Total –4,753 3,921 –832 35,955 –4,572 31,383
Net change –14,699 –3,949 –18,648 42,547 4,822 47,369
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.3 –3.6 –16.8 38.4 4.4 42.8
Option value—age dummies (with shift)
Beneﬁt –19,452 86 –19,366 78,502 250 78,751
Taxes: Total –4,753 7,192 2,440 35,955 –4,572 31,383
Net change –14,699 –7,106 –21,805 42,547 4,822 47,369
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –13.3 –6.4 –19.7 38.4 4.4 42.8
Notes: All values reported in 2001 euros. The table shows the total eﬀect of the reform (shown in table
2.4) decomposed into mechanical and behavioral components. The ﬁrst row shows the change in bene-
ﬁts. The second row shows the change in all taxes. The third row shows the net change (the change in ben-
eﬁts minus the change in taxes). The fourth row shows the net change as a percent of base beneﬁts (shown
in table 2.4).across table 2.4, we present the simulated levels of beneﬁts and taxes under
the base system as well as the reform systems. Going across table 2.5, the
total change is decomposed into its behavioral and mechanical compo-
nents. Within each panel, we show the total PDV of beneﬁts and taxes sep-
arately. In table 2.4, the tax total is broken down into its payroll, income,
and consumption components. All values have been converted to 2001 Eu-
ros, using the December 31, 2001, exchange rate of C$1.4185   €1.00.
2.5.1 Base System Results
In the ﬁrst column of table 2.4 we present the base IS system results. For
the peak value—linear age simulation, the PDV of beneﬁts totals €111,106
per working family. The payroll tax total of €15,202 is lower than may be
the case for other countries, reﬂecting Canada’s relatively low rates of pay-
roll tax. To put this in context, a single worker earning the average indus-
trial wage in 1991 would have generated payroll tax revenue for the gov-
ernment in the 1991 ﬁscal year of about €2,704. The PDV of income taxes
for the average family in our cohort is €81,687. Taking the diﬀerence of tax-
able income and the taxes paid by the cohort families, we estimate a total
PDV of after-tax income of €337,225. When multiplied by the consump-
tion tax factor of 0.1115, we arrive at the estimate for the PDV of con-
sumption tax revenues of €37,595. The total PDV of the three sources of
tax revenue generated by the cohort families from age 55 on is €134,485.
While the total tax revenue is larger than the future beneﬁts, it must be
recalled that tax revenue funds other government spending in addition to
the IS system. As well, the tax revenue generated by the family before age
55 is not included in this calculation. For these reasons, no inferences
about the sustainability of Canada’s IS system can be drawn from these
totals.
Looking down the six panels in table 2.4, there is little variation in the
calculations across simulations. The age dummy simulations with and
without the shift are identical for the base case because the age dummies
do not shift in calculating the base case exit probabilities.
2.5.2 Three-Year Reform
The Three-Year Reform raises all of the critical entitlement ages in the
IS system by three years. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the age proﬁle of the
PDV of beneﬁts and taxes, respectively. Two observations are noteworthy.
First, the age proﬁle of IS beneﬁts is quite ﬂat. This reﬂects the actuarial ad-
justment made to CPP/QPP beneﬁts, and the fact that OAS and GIS ben-
eﬁts are paid independent of participation in the labor market. In contrast,
the age proﬁle of taxes slopes steeply upward. Lifetime taxes are higher for
those exiting the labor market at older ages, because they have more years
of labor market earnings that are subject to income and payroll taxes. The
second observation relates to the diﬀerences between the base case and
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minishes with age. This is generated by the fewer years of expected future
pension receipt for those retiring later.
The peak value—linear age panel of table 2.4 reveals that this reform
would cut beneﬁt levels to €91,328, which is 17.8 percent less than the base
IS system level of beneﬁts. However, all three types of tax revenue for the
government would increase under the reform, with the total rising by 6.8
percent. This increase is driven by a large increase in payroll tax and in-
come tax revenues.
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Fig. 2.1 Income security wealth by age of labor force exit, Three-Year Reform
Fig. 2.2 Total taxes by age of labor force exit, Three-Year ReformUnderlying these increases in tax revenues is an increase in work gener-
ated by the reform. This can be clearly seen in ﬁgure 2.3. The distribution
of retirement ages shifts out to the right, as the reform provides incentives
to spend more years in the labor force. The incentive is provided both by
the wealth eﬀect of lower lifetime IS beneﬁts and by an increase in the av-
erage peak value dynamic incentive measure, as the age at which peak ben-
eﬁts are reached moves to older ages.
In table 2.5, the total changes are broken down into the mechanical
eﬀect and the behavioral eﬀect. Beneﬁts drop mostly because of the me-
chanical eﬀect. With no change in behavior, the government will save
money by paying three fewer years of pension beneﬁts. The small behav-
ioral eﬀect reﬂects the approximate actuarial fairness of the CPP/QPP sys-
tem. Even though workers are retiring later, the PDV of their beneﬁts
changes little.
The extra work generated by the reform has a larger impact on tax rev-
enues. Overall, tax revenues increase by €9,083. The mechanical eﬀect is
negative, as taxable income falls with the decrease in lifetime IS beneﬁts.
However, the behavioral eﬀect captures the increase in government rev-
enues generated by the increased work under the reform.
The importance of considering tax revenues is made clear in ﬁgure 2.4.
We graph the total eﬀect by age, for both the gross ISWbeneﬁts and the net
of taxes ISW. The gross ISW in the darker bars is negative through age 63,
reﬂecting the mechanical savings and the behavioral savings as retirement
shifts later. However, starting at age 64, the total eﬀect on gross IS beneﬁts
108 Michael Baker, Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan
Fig. 2.3 Distribution of retirement ages: Three-Year Reform, option value—
linear agebecomes positive. This is generated by the behavioral eﬀect. Under the re-
form, there is now more retirement at later ages than under the base case.
This increases the cost of IS beneﬁts to the government for those retiring at
later ages.
The light bars in ﬁgure 2.4 show the PDV of IS beneﬁts less the PDV of
taxes. Even when the gross IS beneﬁts show a cost to the government after
age 63, the light bars still show an overall decrease in the government’s ﬁs-
cal outﬂow. The diﬀerence is the extra work that is generated by the reform.
Those who are shifting to retirement at later ages now work more years,
which generates more tax revenue for the government. So, even though the
actuarially adjusted IS beneﬁts of later retirees costs the government more,
the taxes they pay until they retire overcompensates for the increased IS
beneﬁt cost.
Overall, the net ﬁscal balance of the government under the Three-Year
Reform changes by €28,860 per family, or 26 percent of the base level of
beneﬁts. Importantly, almost half of the 26 percent change is accounted for
by the behavioral eﬀect. In other words, an analysis that assumes static re-
tirement behavior would underestimate the ﬁscal eﬀects of the Three-Year
Reform by about half.
The age-dummy simulations are quite informative for the Three-Year
Reform. Looking ﬁrst at table 2.4, the predicted beneﬁt level for peak value
in the age-dummy simulations is approximately the same as for the linear
age simulation. The taxes, however, show some diﬀerences. For the no-shift
simulation, the total taxes increase by only 0.7 percent, compared to 6.8
percent for the linear age simulation. The with-shift simulation shows an
increase of 4.3 percent in tax revenues.
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Fig. 2.4 Total eﬀect by age of retirement: Three-Year Reform, option value—
linear ageAn explanation for these tax revenue diﬀerences can be found in table
2.5. The mechanical eﬀect for the two dummy-shift simulations is identi-
cal, as expected. In the no-shift simulation, the behavioral eﬀect is driven
only by the changes in IS incentives. Here, the behavioral eﬀect on taxes is
smaller than in the linear age case at €5,716. However, for the with-shift
simulation, the behavioral eﬀect is nearly twice as large, at €10,451. This
suggests that the shift in the age dummies generates only half of the behav-
ioral eﬀect. In other words, even with the seemingly strong assumption that
age-related retirement propensities do not change when the normal retire-
ment age changes, we still generate a substantial behavioral eﬀect for taxes
of €5,716 per family.
In ﬁgures 2.5and 2.6, the age dummy simulations are graphed. These ﬁg-
ures follow similar trends as the linear age graphs, but less smoothly, as
particular ages have stronger eﬀects. For example, there is a spike in pre-
reform retirement at age 65 that moves to age 68 in the with-shift age
dummy graph in both ﬁgure 2.5 and ﬁgure 2.6.
The overall net ﬁscal savings for government implied by the two age-
dummy simulations is 18.6 percent of base beneﬁts for the no-shift case
and 22.8 percent for the with-shift case. The two biggest contributors to
these changes are the mechanical eﬀect on beneﬁts as workers are entitled
to fewer years of beneﬁt receipt, and the behavioral eﬀect on taxes as work-
ers have higher lifetime earnings.
The option-value simulations in the bottom three panels of tables 2.4
and 2.5 show a similar pattern as the peak-value simulations for the Three-
Year Reform. The overall change in net beneﬁts as a percent of base bene-
ﬁts is 22.3 percent for the linear age simulation. For the age-dummy simu-
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Fig. 2.5 Distribution of retirement ages: Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (with shift)lations, the no-shift case shows a smaller behavioral eﬀect than the with-
shift case.
We present the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects for all six simulations
graphically as a percentage of 2001 GDP in ﬁgure 2.7. Our sample is based
on a 10 percent sample of the Canadian labor force outside the primary
sector, so we arrived at the totals by summing over all 12,058 cohort mem-
bers and multiplying by ten. The behavioral eﬀect totals €1.7 billion and
the mechanical eﬀect totals €1.8 billion for the peak value—linear age sim-
ulation. Together, the two eﬀects sum to about 0.45 percent of Canada’s
€770 billion GDP in 2001.
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Fig. 2.6 Total eﬀect by age of retirement: Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (with shift)
Fig. 2.7 Fiscal implications of reform as a percent of GDP: Three-Year ReformFor both peak value and option value, the largest behavioral eﬀect is
found in the linear age speciﬁcation. In both cases, this is caused by a larger
wealth eﬀect driven by a higher estimated ISWcoeﬃcient. The second and
third bars show the diﬀerence between the age-dummies results with and
without the age-dummy shift. As these two cases represent the two extreme
assumptions for the treatment of the age dummies, they therefore bound
the magnitude of the behavioral eﬀect in the age-dummies simulations.
2.5.3 Common Reform
The Common Reform gives workers a beneﬁt based on 60 percent of the
average of their best forty years of lifetime earnings. Table 2.4 reveals that
this reform has a large wealth eﬀect. For the peak value linear age simu-
lation, the level of beneﬁts increases by 73.3 percent. The extra taxable
income generated by the higher beneﬁts leads to increases in income tax
revenue and consumption tax revenue. However, payroll tax revenue de-
clines under the reform. This suggests that the reform decreases the
amount of work—that it leads to earlier retirement.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 explore the Common Reform graphically. First, ﬁg-
ure 2.8 shows the dramatic increase in IS beneﬁts under the reform. Figure
2.9 shows the shift to earlier ages of retirement in the distribution of re-
tirement ages under the option value–linear age speciﬁcation. We now
look into the source of this large shift to earlier retirement ages.
In table 2.5 we decompose the total eﬀect of the Common Reform into
the behavioral and mechanical eﬀect. For beneﬁts, the mechanical eﬀect is
much larger than the behavioral eﬀect. The beneﬁts paid under the Com-
mon Reform, at 60 percent of lifetime earnings, replace a higher propor-
tion of earnings than the existing Canadian IS system. Like the Three-Year
Reform, the larger behavioral eﬀects can be seen in tax revenue. For the
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Fig. 2.8 Income security wealth by age of labor force exit, Common Reformpeak value–linear age simulation, tax revenue falls by €7,944 per family be-
cause of the behavioral eﬀect. With the age-dummy simulation, however,
the drop in tax revenue is reversed.
The explanation for this diﬀerence lies in the relative strengths of the
wealth eﬀect and the dynamic incentive eﬀect. The average value for peak
value over our sample in the base case was €779. With the Common Re-
form, this increased to €4,370. Given the negative coeﬃcient on peak value
in tables 2.1 and 2.2, this implies a shift toward later retirement. In con-
trast, the wealth eﬀect of the Common Reform shifts retirement in the
other direction, as more wealth leads to a desire to retire earlier. However,
as can be seen in tables 2.1 and 2.2, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on ISW
falls dramatically between the linear age and the age-dummy estimates,
from 0.077 to 0.022 for males and similarly for females. So, the wealth
eﬀect of the Common Reform dominates the dynamic eﬀect for the linear
age simulation, but with the small estimated coeﬃcient on ISWfor the age-
dummy simulation, the dynamic incentive eﬀect is able to dominate the
wealth eﬀect and retirement pushes later.
For the option value simulations, the decrease in work under the reform
is stronger. Again, the wealth eﬀect of ISW leads to earlier retirement.
However, in contrast to the peak value case, the dynamic incentive of the
option value is not able to overcome the wealth eﬀect. So, the net eﬀect is a
larger decrease in work. The diﬀerence between the linear age and age-
dummy simulations for option value are driven by the same factor as for
peak value—the change in the ISW coeﬃcient in tables 2.1 and 2.2.
In ﬁgure 2.10 we summarize the total impact of the Common Reform as
a percent of GDP. In all six cases, the large increase in beneﬁts under the
Common Reform leads to a very large mechanical eﬀect that increases the
cost of the retirement income security system. The ﬁscal implications of
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Fig. 2.9 Distribution of retirement ages: Common Reform, option value—linear agethe behavioral eﬀect, however, are positive only in the cases for which the
wealth eﬀect, inducing earlier retirement, outweighs the dynamic incentive
eﬀect. Overall, this reform would result in a large increase in the size of the
retirement income system in Canada.
2.6 Distribution
In addition to looking at the shifts in behavior and the ﬁscal costs of IS
reform, we can use our simulation models to examine how the two reforms
aﬀect the distribution of IS payments. We split our cohort families into
quintiles based on the average lifetime income index described previously
for the Common Reform. For married families, we use the sum of husband
and wife income. For single cohort members, we use only the member’s in-
come. We rank the families based on this income measure separately for
married and single families, so that an equal proportion of married and
single families is in each quintile. The highest-income quintile of the single
group is combined with the top one ﬁfth of families from the married group
to comprise quintile 1. Quintiles 2 through 5 are formed in a similar way,
progressing to the lowest-income households in quintile 5.
Table 2.6 presents the distributional analysis for the option value–linear
age simulations, and table 2.7 the option value–age dummy (with shift)
simulations. The ﬁve quintiles appear in the ﬁve panels of each table.
Across the table, we present the levels of the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes as
well as the changes relative to the base for each reform.
The linear age simulations in table 2.6 show that the base PDV of bene-
ﬁts is remarkably stable across quintiles. This stability reﬂects several as-
pects of Canada’s IS system. First, only earnings up to the YMPE are in-
sured by the CPP/QPP pensions. Since the YMPE is set close to median
earnings, this means that lifetime earnings above the median will result in
no additional CPP/QPP beneﬁts. Second, the only part of the Canadian
system that is related to lifetime earnings is the CPP/QPP component—
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Fig. 2.10 Fiscal implications of reform as a percent of GDP: Common Reformand it replaces a smaller share of the total IS system than do earnings-
related beneﬁts in other countries. Third, the income-tested components of
the IS system tend to compensate those with lower lifetime earnings. Fi-
nally, higher-income individuals will be subject to higher rates of income
taxation as well as potentially face the clawback of OAS beneﬁts. Com-
bined, these factors make the proﬁle of IS beneﬁts very ﬂat with respect to
changes in lifetime earnings.
Taxes, on the other hand, show a progressive pattern. The larger tax
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Table 2.6 Distribution analysis: Option value—linear age
Present discounted value Change relative to base PDV
Base Three-Year Common Three-Year Reform Common Reform
Quintile 1 (highest)
Beneﬁts 117,795 96,466 311,682 –21,329 193,888
Taxes: Total 239,146 252,177 253,924 13,032 14,778
Net change –34,360 179,110
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –29.2 152.1
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 119,857 98,303 248,739 –21,554 128,882
Taxes: Total 134,394 140,252 158,074 5,858 23,680
Net change –27,411 105,203
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –22.9 87.8
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 116,664 95,717 187,970 –20,946 71,306
Taxes: Total 117,619 121,447 133,518 3,828 15,898
Net change –24,774 55,408
Change in % of 
base beneﬁts –21.2 47.5
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 109,254 90,276 129,602 –18,978 20,348
Taxes: Total 105,408 107,734 114,728 2,326 9,320
Net change –21,304 11,028
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –19.5 10.1
Quintile 5 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 91,843 76,002 60,987 –15,841 –30,856
Taxes: Total 73,622 74,216 77,069 594 3,447
Net change –16,435 –34,303
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –17.9 –37.3
Note: All values reported in 2001 euros. The ﬁrst three columns show the PDV of beneﬁts and taxes un-
der the base plan and under the two illustrative reforms. The last two columns show the change relative
to the base, for beneﬁts and taxes. Each of the ﬁve panels down the table shows the results for a diﬀerent
lifetime income quintile, from highest to lowest.levels in the higher-income quintiles reﬂect higher levels of CPP/QPP ben-
eﬁts, labor income while still in the labor force, and nonlabor income. As
we move down the table to the lower-income quintiles, these sources of in-
come are replaced with nontaxable Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
and Spouse Allowance (SPA) beneﬁts.
The Three-Year Reform does not dramatically alter this pattern of dis-
tribution. Beneﬁts are relatively ﬂat across the earnings distribution, while
taxes increase sharply with lifetime earnings. The net beneﬁts drop in all
quintiles. The percentage decrease follows a monotonic pattern, with the
highest decrease in the ﬁrst quintile and the lowest decrease in the ﬁfth
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Table 2.7 Distribution analysis: Option value—age dummies (with shift)
Present discounted value Change relative to base PDV
Base Three-Year Common Three-Year Reform Common Reform
Quintile 1 (highest)
Beneﬁts 117,647 97,205 313,903 –20,442 196,256
Taxes: Total 236,465 243,786 301,467 7,321 65,003
Net change –27,764 131,253
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –23.6 111.6
Quintile 2
Beneﬁts 119,630 97,971 253,096 –21,659 133,466
Taxes: Total 133,067 135,948 181,308 2,881 48,241
Net change –24,540 85,225
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –20.5 71.2
Quintile 3
Beneﬁts 116,343 95,419 190,649 –20,924 74,306
Taxes: Total 116,907 118,519 146,348 1,613 29,441
Net change –22,536 44,865
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –19.4 38.6
Quintile 4
Beneﬁts 108,572 90,108 129,795 –18,464 21,223
Taxes: Total 105,572 106,224 118,983 652 13,410
Net change –19,116 7,812
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –17.6 7.2
Quintile 5 (lowest)
Beneﬁts 91,294 75,956 59,802 –15,339 –31,492
Taxes: Total 73,857 73,587 74,676 –269 819
Net change –15,069 –32,311
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –16.5 –35.4
Note: See table 2.6 notes.quintile. This suggests that a reform to delay beneﬁt receipt by three years
may be progressive.
The Common Reform has a very diﬀerent impact on distribution. First-
quintile households have their insurable earnings capped at a much higher
level under the Common Reform than is the case in the status quo CPP/
QPP, resulting in much higher beneﬁts. The ﬁrst-quintile households have
almost no changes in their taxes, however. This result stems from the huge
wealth eﬀect on retirement implied by the large estimated income security
wealth (ISW) coeﬃcient combined with the large change in ISW. Govern-
ment tax revenue does not increase, because they lose income and payroll
taxes on the labor that is no longer provided by this quintile. Overall, the
eﬀect on the ﬁrst quintile is a net increase of 156.2 percent over base bene-
ﬁts.
Further down the income distribution, the eﬀect of the Common Re-
form is far less generous. For the ﬁfth quintile, the replacement of the in-
come-tested beneﬁts and the OAS demogrant by a pure earnings-related
beneﬁt decreases the average level of beneﬁts by one third. This has a
wealth eﬀect on their labor supply, causing them to work more. This gen-
erates more income and payroll tax revenue for the government than in the
base case for this quintile. These households suﬀer a drop of 37.8 percent
of base beneﬁts under this reform.
The distribution analysis is repeated for the option value–age dummy
simulations in table 2.7. The patterns are very similar to those in table 2.6,
using peak value. The primary diﬀerence lies in the smaller magnitudes of
the responses to the reforms across all income quintiles. Overall, the con-
clusions drawn from the distributional analysis in table 2.6 seem insensitive
to alternative speciﬁcations.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we study the ﬁscal implications of reforms to Canada’s re-
tirement income security system. There are three major ﬁndings. First, any
reform has both mechanical and behavioral ﬁscal eﬀects, and we ﬁnd that
the behavioral eﬀects are important. In some of our models, the behavioral
eﬀect represents almost half of the total eﬀect of the reform. Second, re-
forms that shift retirement to later years improve government balances
through increases in tax revenue generated by the increase in work among
the elderly. Any analysis that does not consider the dynamic response to re-
forms will miss this channel, through which reform has an impact on gov-
ernment budgets. Finally, reforms to the mix of earnings-related beneﬁts,
demogrants, and income-tested beneﬁts can have important distributional
implications.
Two important caveats aﬀect the interpretation of our results. First, our
treatment of some aspects of the model is crude. For example, our as-
Simulating the Response to Reform of Canada’s IS Programs 117sumption of ﬁxed spousal labor supply and our treatment of consumption
taxation ignore many important channels of adjustment to retirement in-
come and incentives. Second, the reforms we consider are not balanced
budget reforms and therefore set aside important general equilibrium and
public ﬁnance considerations. In light of these caveats, it is important to in-
terpret our results as illustrative of how behavioral responses to retirement
incentives can aﬀect all aspects of the government budget, rather than de-
ﬁnitive estimates of the beneﬁts of reform.
As future governments in Canada and other countries contemplate re-
forms of their retirement income systems, we conclude that consideration
of the full ﬁscal and distributive impact of behavioral responses to the re-
form can signiﬁcantly improve the analysis of proposed reforms.
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